The 'catuskoti' or tetralemma in Buddhist logic is a problematic subject from the modern logical point of view. Recently a many-valued paraconsistent logic was proposed in order to formalize catuskoti adequately by G. Priest. On the other hand a slight modification of the formalization of catuskoti seems to allow an appropriate interpretation in the framework of the classical propositional calculus in the mathematical logic developed by Russell-Whitehead and HilbertAckermann.
Introduction
The catus . kot . i or tetralemma in Buddhist logic is the tuple of the four alternatives A, not A, both A and not A, neither A nor not A,
where A is a proposition or a predicate. From the modern logical point of view it was investigated by K. N. Jayatilleke [5] (1967), D. S. Ruegg [9] (1977), R. D. Gunaratne [4] (1986), J. Westerhoff [12] (2006) and others. If we insist the classical two-valued logic, this tuple may be formulated as A, ¬A, A ∧ (¬A), ¬(A ∨ (¬A)).
Here and hereafter we adopt the propositional calculus developed in [10] . The definitions of symbols and terminology and axioms follow it except for using the symbol ¬ instead of ∼. However the fourth alternative ¬(A ∨ (¬A)) of (2) is equivalent to (¬A) ∧ A and to the third alternative if we are confined to the classical logic. Therefore G. Priest [8] (2010) introduced a formal logical machinery which may be more appropriate than the classical one. An adequate formalization of the catus . kot . i requires a four-valued logic. See [8] .
In this note, we introduce a modification of the catus . kot . i, and give an its interpretation in the framework of the classical two-valued logic in the form of the propositional calculus developed in [10, Chapter 2] .
Modification and interpretation
Let us modify the tuple (2) replacing the third alternative A ∧ (¬A) by A ∨ (¬A). That is, we consider the tuple of formulas A, ¬A, A ∨ (¬A), ¬(A ∨ (¬A)).
Here A is a formula of a propositional calculus Σ we consider. Of course the third formula is identically true (a tautology, ), and the fourth formula is identically false (a contradiction, ) in the usual semantics of the classical propositional calculus. The characterization of this tuple is as follows. Let us denote by L 0 the set of all sentence letters of Σ and by L the set of all formulas of Σ. A mapping V from L 0 into {0, 1} is called a valuation. If a valuation V is given, it can be uniquely extended to a mapping from L into {0, 1} by dint of the usual truth value tables. (0 stands for 'false', and 1 stands for 'true'.) Let us denote this unique extension by the same letter V in abbreviation. Now we assume that there are a valuation V 0 such that V 0 (A) = 0 and a valuation V 1 such that V 1 (A) = 1. In such a case we shall say that the formula A is generic in the calculus Σ. Actually it is the case if A is one of the sentence letters of Σ, that is, a member of L 0 . It is not the case if A is a tautology or a contradiction.
Then for any formula P the pair of truth values (V 0 (P ), V 1 (P )) should be either (0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0) or (1, 1) . Therefore the set L of all formulas of Σ is divided into the following four subsets:
, respectively. This is the situation of the modified tuple (3) .
Hence the interpretation of this modified catus . kot . i is: If somebody denies all these alternatives, then he/she intends to mean by abbreviation using the representatives that he/she declares that the ultimate truth or the reality cannot be described by any formula of any propositional calculus in which A is a generic formula. Particularly any propositional calculus for which A is a sentence letter doesn't work to describe the reality.
Note. If a formula P is a contradiction , like A ∧ (¬A), then (V 0 (P ), V 1 (P )) = (0, 0). But the inverse is not true, that is, P is not necessarily a contradiction when (V 0 (P ), V 1 (P )) = (0, 0). If Q is a tautology , then (V 0 (P ), V 1 (P )) = (1, 1), but the inverse is not true. In fact, as an example, let us consider the case in which A is a sentence letter. Let B be another sentence letter such that A = B. Then there are valuations V 0 , V 1 such that V 0 (A) = V 0 (B) = 1 and V 1 (A) = V 1 (B) = 0. Put P = A ∧ (¬B) and Q = A ∨ (¬B). Then we have (V 0 (P ), V 1 (P )) = (0, 0) and (V 0 (Q), V 1 (Q)) = (1, 1). But, since there is a valuation V 2 such that V 2 (A) = 1, V 2 (B) = 0 for which V 2 (P ) = 1 so that P is not a contradiction. Since there is a valuation V 3 such that V 3 (A) = 0, V 3 (B) = 1 for which V 3 (Q) = 0 so that Q is not a tautology.
The idea to consider the pairs of the truth values is related to the philosophical point of view of G. Priest [8] . For the details see the Appendix.
Tathagata after the death
As the first example we take a passage from 'Khema Sutta' (SN44. Q4: Kimpanayye, neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato parammaran .ā ti.
A4: Etampi kho mahārāja avyākatam . bhagavatā: "neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato parammaran .ā "ti.
Thus the tuple of the four alternatives in the Pali is
A, na A, A ca na ca A, neva A na na A.
According to our modification the third alternative 'A ca na ca A' is formalized by A ∨ (¬A).
The essential point lies on the difference between A ∨ (¬A) and A ∧ (¬A).We wonder whether the formalization as A ∧ (¬A) of the translation 'both A and not A' is inevitable or not.
Let us look at Chinese translations. We could not find a Chinese translation of this 'Khema Sutta', but Chinese translations by Gunabhadra of other many suttas in the group 'Avyakata Samyutta' of 'Samyutta Nikaya' can be found in the Chinese 'ZáĒhán-jīng '. See 'The Taisho Tripitaka' 99-958, -959, -960, -962. The Chinese translation of the four alternatives are:
(Rúlái) yǒu hòusǐ, wú hòusǐ, yǒu wú hòusǐ, fēi yǒu fēi wú hòusǐ or yǒu hòusǐ, wú hòusǐ, yǒu wú hòusǐ, fēi yǒu hòusǐ fēi wú hòusǐ.
Thus the tuple of the four alternatives in the Chinese is
Since 'yǒu' = to have, 'wú'=to lack, 'fēi' =not, 'hòusǐ' =after death, the conjunctions 'and' ,'or' do not appear explicitly. In usual conversations, "Yǒu wú" (or "Yǒu méiyou" colloquially) does not mean "One has and lacks", but means "(Do you) have or don't have?". In the same way "Hǎo buhǎo", not meaning "It's good and bad", means "Is it good or not?", or " How do you think?", where 'hǎo'=good and 'bù'=not. Therefore the putting side by side without conjunction 'A ¬A' should be interpreted as A ∨ (¬A) in these cases as our modification. The interpretation of this tuple is clear. Let A be a formula and V a valuation. The set L of all formulas is divided into the subset L 1/2 of all formulas P such that V (P ) = 0 and the subset L 2/2 of formulas P such that V (P ) = 1. Then A, ¬A are representatives of L 1/2 , L 2/2 respectively if V (A) = 0, while otherwise they are representatives of L 2/2 , L 1/2 respectively. Hence our interpretation of this dilemma is: If somebody denies both two alternatives, he/she intends to mean by abbreviation that any formula of any propositional calculus in which A is a formula cannot describe the reality.
In other words, the denial of both A and ¬A is nothing but the denial of A ∨ (¬A), which is a tautology, and it leads to the denial of all formulas in the propositional calculus considered, since, for any formula P , the formula P → A ∨ (¬A) is a tautology, too. Of course this argument is an intentional confusion of the object logic and the metalogic. Anyway, this dilemma may be a prototype of the catus . kot . i or tetralemma.
Also see 'Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta' (MN72) [14, p. 590] in the 'Majjhima Nikaya', which contains both dilemmas and tetralemmas.
Creator of suffering
As the second example we take a passage from 'Acela Sutta' (SN12.17) [15, p. 546] ... Q7: Teach me about suffering, Blessed One! A7: "The one who acts is the one who experiences the result of the act" amounts to the eternalist statement "suffering is created by oneself". "The one who acts is someone other than the one who experiences the result of the act" amounts to the annihilationist statement "suffering is created by another". Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: With ignorance as condition volitional formations come to be; With volitional formations...
At the moment the English translation can be formulated as
but we modify it as
by replacing the third alternative as in §2. Here A stands for 'suffering is created by oneself " and B stands for 'suffering is created by another'. According to A7, we could assume that B is equivalent to ¬A. But according to Q4, it seems that one can consider 'suffering arises fortuitously (or without any cause, as a result of chance) ' even if suffering is created neither by oneself nor by another. Therefore we do not assume that B is equivalent to ¬A. Our modification means that Q3 is replaced by Q3': Then is it created either by oneself or by another? Can both be allowed?
This modified catus . kot . i can be characterized as follows. Let A and B be formulas in a propositional calculus Σ. First we assume that there are a valuation V 0 such that V 0 (A) = 0 and V 0 (B) = 1 and a valuation V 1 such that V 1 (A) = 1 and V 1 (B) = 0. If it is the case, let us say that A and B is separable or independent. Of course it is the case if A and B are distinct sentence letters of Σ. For any formula P the pair of the truth values (V 0 (P ), V 1 (P )) should be one of (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (0, 0). Clearly the formulas of the tuple (7) are representatives of the four possible cases. The situation is same as in §2, where B is ¬A. But we do not assume here that A ∨ B is identically true and ¬(A ∨ B) is identically false. Therefore our interpretation is that, when somebody denies all the four alternatives of (7), then he/she intends to mean in abbreviation that the reality cannot be described by any formula of any propositional calculus in which A and B are independent formulas.
By A4: Kǔ fēi zì fēi tā, cǐ yì wújì.
Thus the tuple of the four alternative in Chinese is
A, B, A B, fēi A fēi B.
We note that no conjunctions like 'and' 'or' do not appear explicitly. The thought "I will be percipient", "I will be non-percipient" and "I will be neither percipient nor non-percipient" -these do not occur.
Or in the Pali
Ayamahamasmiti'pissa na hoti, bhavissanti'pissa na hoti, na bhavissanti'pissa na hoti, saññī bhavissanti'pissa na hoti, asaññī bhavissanti'pissa na hoti, nevasaññīnāsaññi bhavissanti'pissa na hotīti.
Here we find the trilemma
where A stands for 'I will be percipient' and B stands for 'I will be nonpercipient", which formalizes
Or the trilemma A, ¬A, ¬(A ∨ (¬A)) (11) formalizes A, a-A, neva-A nā-A, where A stands for 'saññī bhavissanti'. The trilemma (10) lacks the third alternative of the tetralemma (7). However, when somebody denies all the alternatives of the trilemma (10), he/she implicitly denies the third alternative A ∨ B of the tetralemma (7) too, since the denial of both A and B entails the denial of A ∨ B provided that we hold the classical logic as the metalogic. Therefore the interpretation of the trilemma (10) or (11) is the same as that of the tetralemma (7) or (3). In other words this trilemma is equivalent to the tetralemma.
Dual modification
An alternative modification of catus . kot . i could be given by replacing (7) 
In this tuple (12) the third alternative coincides with the usual translation of catus . kot . i, but the fourth alternative is formalized in different way to the usual one. When B = ¬A, the tuple (12) turns out to be
instead of (3). The components of the tuple (13) are representatives of
respectively, where L j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, are the subsets of formulas defined in §2. Thus the interpretation of this alternative modification of catus . kot . i is the same, that is, If somebody denies all these alternatives, then he/she intends to mean by abbreviation using the representatives that he/she declares that the ultimate truth or the reality cannot be described by any formula of any propositional calculus in which A is a generic formula. Particularly any propositional calculus for which A is a sentence letter doesn't work to describe the reality.
In fact the pair of the third and fourth alternatives of (13) is the mere exchange of those of (3). On the other hand, the relation between (12) and (7) can be different from a mere exchange of order if B is not ¬A. But the tuple of the subsets of formulas considered in §4 represented by the components of (12) coincides with those of (7) Bhikkhus, there are four kinds of persons found existing in the world. What four? One who is practicing for his own welfare but not for the welfare of others; one who is practicing for the welfare of others but not for his own welfare; one who is practicing neither for his own welfare nor for the welfare of others; and one who is practicing both for his own welfare and for the welfare of others.
Here we can find the tetralemma
where A stands for 'he is practicing for his own welfare' and B stands for 'he is practicing for the welfare of others'. Note that in the Pali this passage reads:
Attahittāya pat . ipanno no parahitāya; Parahitāya pat . ipanno no attahitāya; Neva attahitāya ca pat . ipanno no parahitāya; Attahitāya ca pat . ipanno parahitāya ca. A no B, B no A, neva A ca no B, A Here the Blessed One does not intend to deny the four alternatives, but intends merely to classify people, although He may agree with the opinion that one which satisfies A ∧ B is the most excellent and sublime. It is not the case that the four alternatives are affirmed simultaneously for a single person. By the Chinese translation Taisho 125-25.10 of AN 4.102 this is explicitly expressed as Huò yǒu yún léiér bù yù, huò yǒu yún yùér bù léi, huò ..., where "yǒu yún léiér bù yù" means 'there is a cloud which thunders and does not rain' and so on, and "huò" means the disjunction, that is, "Huò ..., huò ..." means "Either ... or ....", or, more precisely speaking, "On the one hand ..., on the other hand,..." in this context. Here "ér" = 'and', "huò" = 'or' are explicit conjunction words.
That is
Although we cannot give a clear example in which all the alternatives are affirmed simultaneously, we would like to spend few words about affirmative catus . kot . i in which all the four alternatives are affirmed.
Let the tuple (7) be called the modified catus . kot . i generated by A, B and the tuple (12) be called the dual modified catus . kot . i generated by A, B. Therefore the tuple (3) is the modified catus . kot . i generated by A, ¬A, and (13) is the dual modified catus . kot . i generated by A, ¬A.
Then it is easy to see under the classical propositional calculus that the dual modified catus . kot . i (13) generated by A, ¬A is equivalent to the modified catus . kot . i generated by A, ¬A except for the exchange of the order of the alternatives, since
Now suppose that somebody denies all the alternatives of the dual modified catus . kot . i generated by ¬A, ¬B, that is,
If we formalize this metalogical denial by the operation ¬ on all the alternatives in the object symbol logic, then the result is easily seen to be the modified catus . kot . i generated by A, B, that is, (7) . In this sense the affirmation of (7) is nothing but the negation of the dual catus . kot . i generated by ¬A, ¬B. Here the affirmation means affirmation of all the alternatives, and the negation means denial of all the alternatives. We note that A, B are independent if and only if ¬A, ¬B are independent.
Therefore we can say that the affirmation of the modified catus . kot . i (3) is nothing but the negation of (3) itself . Of course this argument is a confusion of the object logic and the metalogic, but the conclusion, the coincidence of affirmation with negation, is a dialectical situation in a sense. So, if we want to formalize this argument as the total, we should adopt a paraconsistent logic, maybe.
Remark 4. Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XVIII.8 is a problematic verse, which reads:
Everything is real and is not real, Both real and not real, Neither real nor not real. This is Lord Buddha's teaching.
According to J. L. Garfield, [3, p. 250] , in contrast with [6, p.113 ], this verse is an example of affirmative catus . kot . i without intention of denial, and Nāgārjuna here intends merely to mean "Everything is conventionally real, and is ultimately unreal; Everything has both characteristics; Nothing is ultimately real". Therefore the opinion of Garfield may be that a reading of this verse as an affirmative catus . kot . i which is equivalent to the negative catus . kot . i dialectically as above is a nihilistic one which is very hard to sustain. See 
where A and B are formulas. (This tuple is that of AN 4.99 mentioned in §5 except for the exchange of the order of the alternatives.) We can consider that this is the proper (unmodified) catus . kot . i. Hereafter we denote by C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 the alternatives of the tuple (14) . It is easy to verify the properties
and
by using the auxiliary truth-value table:
A B C 1 C 2 C (14) is equivalent to (2), say, A, ¬A, , , and this is not interesting as pointed in §1. However we can consider the case in which A is ∃xF x and B is ∃x¬F x, where F is a one-place predicate and x is a variable. Here we adopt the classical predicate calculus developed in [10, Chapter 4] . In this case it is easy to verify that the tuple (14) is equivalent to ∀xF x, ∀x¬F x, (∃xF x) ∧ (∃x¬F x), ∀x(F x ∧ (¬F x)),
since ¬∃x¬F x ⇔ ∀xF x, ¬∃xF x ⇔ ∀x¬F x.
Here actually we have C 4 ⇔ but C 3 can be nonequivalent to when the domain of the variable x contains distinct elements.
So, this catus . kot . i may formalize the antānatavāda argument very well, if we consider that F x stands for 'the world is finite and bounded with respect to the direction x'. In fact, if a stands for 'up-and-down' and b stands for 'east-west-south-and-north', the third ascetic or brahmin believes that both F a and ¬F b are true, therefore, C 3 is true. Moreover we note that the tuple
is clearly equivalent to the tuple
as described in the text of the Sutta little bit redundantly.
In view of (15)(16) the saying P5 of the Blessed One is exact. If somebody denies all the alternatives C i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4, as not to be attached, then the result is the absolute empty, or 'nibbuti' (=nibbāna, perfect peace beyond reasoning) and 'anupādā-vimutta' (emancipation without clinging).
